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 3 
Summary	  	  
	   1. Macro-­‐economic	  policy	  should	  be	  evaluated	  and	  devised	  according	  to	  sustainability	  criteria	  alongside	  economic	  and	  social	  criteria.	  Economic	  goals,	  whether	  growth	  of	  GDP,	  productivity	  or	  competitiveness	  should	  not	  trump	  equity/justice	  or	  sustainability.	  But	  nor	  should	  environmental	  goals	  trump	  social	  goals.	  The	  urgent	  challenge	  addressed	  in	  this	  note	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  macroeconomic	  framework	  that	  supports	  ‘eco-­‐social’	  policies	  to	  pursue	  both	  goals	  simultaneously.	  	  	  2. The	  overriding	  challenge	  of	  climate	  change	  requires	  fast	  and	  transformative	  improvement	  in	  eco-­‐efficiency	  across	  a	  myriad	  of	  domains	  (S1	  or	  ‘Sustainability	  1’	  policies).	  However,	  because	  this	  would	  continue	  the	  widespread	  ‘outsourcing’	  of	  emissions	  from	  the	  OECD	  world	  and	  for	  other	  reasons,	  attention	  must	  also	  be	  paid	  to	  consumption	  policies.	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  on	  policies	  to	  ‘recompose’	  consumption	  (S2	  policies).	  	   3. To	  achieve	  effective	  S1	  policies	  will	  require	  a	  rising	  share	  of	  investment	  and	  public	  investment	  in	  GDP;	  and	  to	  achieve	  this	  more	  equitably	  and	  efficiently	  will	  require	  a	  rising	  share	  of	  government	  consumption	  expenditures	  in	  GDP.	  Finally,	  for	  global	  and	  national	  reasons,	  these	  in	  turn	  will	  require	  a	  falling	  import	  surplus	  (M-­‐X/GDP).	  	  4. Thus	  the	  share	  of	  personal	  consumption	  will	  be	  squeezed.	  How	  far	  this	  would	  result	  in	  an	  absolute	  squeeze	  in	  average	  consumption	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  growth	  of	  GDP,	  but	  it	  would	  seem	  prudent	  to	  assume	  a	  considerably	  slower	  rate	  of	  growth	  over	  the	  next	  decades	  than	  over	  the	  three	  decades	  prior	  to	  2008.	  	  5. In	  a	  context	  of	  current	  egregious	  inequality,	  such	  a	  consumption	  squeeze	  would	  be	  highly	  regressive.	  Thus	  it	  would	  need	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	  ‘classic’	  redistribution	  policies.	  However	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  these	  alone	  would,	  cet	  par,	  increase	  rather	  than	  reduce	  aggregate	  emissions.	  This	  paper	  therefore	  considers	  alternative	  ‘recomposition’	  policies	  (S2).	  	  6. Just	  and	  sustainable	  macroeconomic	  planning	  should	  take	  into	  account	  two	  further	  policy	  dimensions:	  the	  emissions	  intensity	  of	  different	  items	  of	  consumption,	  and	  the	  necessitousness	  of	  these	  items.	  Ways	  of	  measuring	  both	  of	  these	  are	  proposed.	  	  7. When	  personal	  consumption	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  analysed	  in	  this	  way,	  an	  awkward	  policy	  dilemma	  immediately	  appears:	  almost	  all	  necessities	  are	  high	  carbon,	  while	  most	  ‘luxuries’	  emit	  lower	  than	  average	  GHGs.	  Transport	  is	  also	  high	  carbon	  and	  comprises	  both	  necessary	  spending	  given	  current	  infrastructure	  and	  luxury	  spending.	  	  8. Thus	  a	  radical	  macro-­‐economic	  framework	  needs	  to	  endorse	  and	  devise	  new	  ‘eco-­‐social’	  policies	  to	  serve	  both	  justice	  and	  sustainability	  goals.	  Three	  approaches	  are	  suggested:	  taxing	  high-­‐carbon	  luxury	  consumption,	  variable	  pricing	  of	  high-­‐carbon	  necessities,	  and	  rationing	  carbon.	  	  	  	  
    
 4 
Setting	  the	  scene	  
	  Almost	  every	  discussion	  of	  an	  alternative	  macroeconomics	  ignores	  –	  inexplicably	  and	  recklessly	  -­‐	  the	  environment.	  Global	  warming	  poses	  a	  looming	  threat	  to	  habitats,	  economies	  and	  human	  wellbeing	  which	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  And	  policies	  to	  mitigate	  dangerous	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  future	  –	  it	  cannot	  be	  totally	  prevented	  –	  pose	  real	  challenges	  to	  our	  management	  of	  the	  economy	  here	  and	  now.	  This	  note	  outlines	  a	  macroeconomic	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  some	  of	  them.	  	  The	  global	  climate/economic	  challenge	  has	  recently	  been	  succinctly	  restated	  by	  Lord	  Stern	  (2015:	  279).	  To	  achieve	  a	  50-­‐50	  chance	  of	  avoiding	  global	  warming	  exceeding	  2°C	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century,	  and	  taking	  population	  growth	  into	  account,	  global	  emissions	  must	  be	  cut	  from	  around	  7	  tonnes	  of	  carbon	  equivalent	  (CO2e)	  per	  person	  per	  year	  now	  to	  no	  more	  than	  2	  tonnes	  by	  2050:	  a	  cut	  of	  c3.5	  times.	  However,	  if	  global	  output	  per	  person	  continues	  to	  grow	  at	  its	  present	  rate	  (roughly	  trebling	  by	  2050),	  then	  global	  emissions	  per	  unit	  of	  output	  must	  fall	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  c10	  times	  by	  2050	  –	  an	  unprecedented	  transformation.	  And	  this	  is	  an	  underestimate	  on	  two	  counts.	  A	  50-­‐50	  chance	  is	  very	  poor	  odds;	  yet	  the	  decarbonisation	  required	  to	  achieve	  a	  higher	  chance	  of	  avoiding	  dangerous	  climate	  change	  will	  be	  more	  drastic	  still.	  And	  logically	  the	  cuts	  required	  in	  rich	  countries,	  where	  average	  per	  capita	  emissions	  vary	  between	  10	  tonnes	  (EU)	  and	  20+	  tonnes	  (US)	  are	  faster	  still.	  	  The	  dominant	  framework	  among	  those	  economists	  who	  do	  pay	  attention	  to	  climate	  and	  environmental	  economics	  is	  ‘green	  growth’.	  It	  amounts	  to	  a	  belief	  that	  raising	  the	  price	  of	  carbon,	  accelerating	  technological	  progress,	  undertaking	  transformational	  investment	  and	  implementing	  other	  incentives	  to	  reduce	  carbon	  intensities	  can,	  and	  with	  luck	  will,	  achieve	  such	  a	  sustained	  pace	  of	  decarbonisation	  (Stern	  2015;	  Grubb	  et	  al	  2014).	  	  	  One	  can	  summarise	  this	  approach	  as	  a	  combination	  of	  initiatives	  and	  programmes	  to	  raise	  global	  and	  national	  eco-­‐efficiency.	  This	  amounts	  to	  improving	  the	  ratio	  of	  output	  over	  emissions	  to	  achieve	  a	  rapid	  absolute	  decoupling	  of	  incomes	  from	  emissions.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  the	  political	  economic,	  geo-­‐political,	  ideological	  and	  institutional	  barriers	  to	  such	  an	  unprecedented	  technological	  transformation	  (all	  of	  which	  Stern	  is	  aware	  of)	  this	  is	  a	  daunting	  challenge,	  which	  any	  reasonable	  person	  might	  think	  impossible.	  	  But	  for	  the	  rich	  countries	  (the	  subject	  of	  this	  note)	  it	  also	  ignores	  the	  consumption	  side.	  National	  emissions	  can	  be	  calculated	  on	  a	  production	  basis	  –	  all	  emissions	  from	  a	  national	  territory,	  which	  is	  the	  Kyoto	  method;	  or	  on	  a	  consumption	  basis	  –	  all	  emissions	  embodied	  in	  the	  consumption	  of	  a	  national	  population.	  At	  the	  global	  level	  these	  will	  be	  identical,	  but	  as	  the	  Figure	  below	  shows,	  they	  have	  become	  seriously	  uncoupled	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  globalisation	  and	  financialisation	  of	  the	  world	  economy.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  in	  countries	  running	  large	  trade	  deficits	  such	  as	  the	  UK.	  For	  example,	  while	  UK	  territorial	  emissions	  of	  CO2	  declined	  by	  19%	  from	  1990-­‐2008,	  the	  emissions	  embodied	  in	  UK	  consumption	  rose	  by	  20%	  (Gough	  2013).	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Calculating	  emissions	  on	  a	  production	  basis,	  as	  does	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  benefits	  the	  global	  North	  and	  disadvantages	  the	  global	  South.	  It	  will	  not	  be	  possible	  for	  the	  rich	  world	  to	  combat	  climate	  change	  without	  also	  addressing	  its	  consumption.	  	  
	  Source:	  House	  of	  Commons	  2012.	  	  Thus	  there	  are	  three	  basic	  ways	  of	  mitigating	  climate	  change,	  denoted	  as	  follows	  (S	  is	  for	  Sustainability):	  S1.	  Improve	  the	  emissions-­‐efficiency	  or	  eco-­‐efficiency	  of	  production	  	  S2.	  Encourage	  low-­‐emission	  consumption	  patterns	  	  S3.	  Reduce	  total	  consumption	  levels	  	  S1	  is	  the	  green	  growth	  approach;	  S3	  is	  the	  argument	  of	  ‘degrowth’	  or	  ‘post-­‐growth’	  advocates.	  My	  approach	  here	  is	  to	  tease	  out	  what	  S2	  –	  encouraging	  low-­‐emission	  consumption	  levels	  –	  would	  entail	  for	  a	  green	  macroeconomic	  policy.	  I	  do	  not	  deny	  the	  central	  importance	  of	  S1	  but	  argue	  that	  it	  will	  not	  be	  enough.	  Nor	  do	  I	  rule	  out	  the	  potential	  need	  for	  S3	  degrowth	  strategies	  at	  some	  stage,	  but	  that	  is	  another	  paper.	  	  	  Equally	  important,	  my	  approach	  also	  seeks	  to	  combine	  equity	  and	  social	  justice	  principles	  with	  sustainability.	  There	  is	  no	  ethical	  case	  for	  meeting	  the	  needs	  of	  future	  generations	  over	  those	  of	  the	  present	  poor;	  nor	  can	  profoundly	  unjust	  programmes	  achieve	  legitimacy	  and	  public	  support	  (Gough	  2015).	  	  
Decomposing	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  	  Two	  Swedish	  economists,	  Jonas	  Nässen	  and	  Jörgen	  Larsson,	  provide	  some	  supporting	  evidence	  of	  the	  need	  for	  S2	  policies.	  Nässen	  (2014)	  decomposes	  the	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change	  in	  consumption-­‐based	  emissions	  in	  Sweden	  between	  1993	  and	  2008	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.	  	  Table	  1.	  Decomposition	  of	  emission	  trends	  in	  Sweden	  1993-­‐2008	  	  	   Impact	  on	  annual	  change	  in	  emissions	  	  (holding	  other	  factors	  constant)	  Population	   +0.5%	  Consumption	  per	  capita	  (C3)	   +1.8%	  Change	  in	  consumption	  composition	  (C2)	   -­‐0.4%	  Eco-­‐efficiency	  of	  production	  (C1)	   -­‐1.4%	  Total	  	   +0.5%	  	  Swedish	  consumption	  emissions	  have	  been	  boosted	  by	  population	  growth	  and	  notably	  by	  per	  capita	  consumption	  growth	  (the	  potential	  target	  of	  S3	  policies)	  and	  deflated	  by	  rising	  eco-­‐efficiency	  of	  production	  (S1)	  and,	  to	  a	  small	  extent,	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  consumption	  (S2).	  	  	  Larsson	  (2014)	  then	  builds	  scenarios	  to	  achieve	  the	  drastic	  emission	  cuts	  needed	  by	  2050	  (Figure	  2).	  If	  the	  rate	  of	  improvement	  of	  eco-­‐efficiency	  matched	  that	  of	  the	  past	  (1.4%pa),	  Sweden’s	  emissions	  would	  almost	  level	  out	  -­‐	  a	  considerable	  achievement	  given	  that	  the	  ‘low	  hanging	  fruit’	  will	  already	  have	  been	  picked.	  But	  even	  a	  doubling	  of	  this	  rate	  would	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  achieve	  the	  necessary	  emissions	  target	  of	  2	  tonnes	  per	  head	  by	  2050.	  	  	  
	  Figure	  3.	  Scenarios	  for	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  from	  private	  consumption	  in	  Sweden	  2012-­‐2050	  Source:	  Larsson	  (2014)	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Thus,	  ‘post-­‐material’	  or	  ‘sufficiency’	  policies	  will	  also	  be	  needed.	  According	  to	  their	  model,	  both	  S2	  and	  S3	  policies	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  hit	  the	  target.	  Policies	  could	  for	  example	  target	  beef	  consumption,	  air	  travel	  and	  expensive	  second	  homes.	  But	  they	  would	  still	  not	  be	  enough.	  The	  goal	  is	  finally	  achieved	  in	  this	  model	  by	  introducing	  an	  S3	  policy	  -­‐	  a	  reduction	  in	  average	  hours	  of	  work.	  	  	  	  I	  call	  all	  S2	  policies	  to	  alter	  the	  composition	  of	  consumption	  recomposition	  policies.	  These	  will	  have	  several	  effects	  –	  on	  distribution	  and	  equity,	  economic	  efficiency	  and	  consumer	  choice	  and	  freedom	  –	  as	  well	  as	  on	  emissions	  and	  environmental	  sustainability.	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  paper	  puts	  forward	  a	  framework	  for	  comprehending	  such	  a	  strategy	  and	  for	  addressing	  some	  of	  these	  questions.	  	  
	  
Recomposition	  for	  a	  green	  economy	  
	  I	  start	  from	  the	  common	  national	  accounting	  identity:	  GDP	  =	  C	  +	  G	  +	  I	  +	  (X-­‐M)	  and	  distinguish	  four	  forms	  of	  recomposition	  for	  sustainability.	  These	  all	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  squeezing	  the	  share	  of	  personal	  consumption,	  which	  is	  analysed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
	  
Raise	  green	  and	  social	  investment	  (I)	  	  There	  is	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  invest	  in	  renewable	  energy,	  energy	  networks,	  transport,	  communications,	  transformed	  cities	  and	  buildings,	  retrofitting	  housing,	  the	  preservation	  and	  enhancement	  of	  natural	  resources	  and	  investment	  enabling	  adaptation	  to	  climate	  change.	  This	  would	  need	  to	  reverse	  the	  decline	  in	  investment	  shares	  across	  the	  OECD	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  and	  raise	  the	  share	  of	  green	  investment	  for	  eco-­‐efficiency.	  An	  earlier	  estimate	  of	  these	  extra	  investment	  needs	  for	  the	  UK	  came	  to	  about	  £50	  billions	  a	  year,	  or	  some	  3%	  of	  GDP	  (Helm	  et	  al	  2009).	  	  	  
Raise	  the	  share	  of	  public	  investment	  (Ig)	  
	  A	  growing	  share	  of	  this	  would	  need	  to	  be	  public	  or	  public-­‐led.	  One	  way	  of	  stating	  this	  case	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘market	  failures’.	  For	  example,	  Stern	  (2015,	  ch.3)	  now	  identifies	  five	  market	  failures	  in	  addition	  to	  excessive	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  –	  the	  ‘greatest	  market	  failure	  of	  all’.	  These	  are:	  i)	  inadequate	  research	  development,	  demonstration	  and	  deployment	  of	  new	  technologies,	  ii)	  imperfections	  in	  risk/capital	  markets,	  iii)	  inadequate	  public	  networks,	  iv)	  inadequate	  reliable	  information,	  and	  v)	  inadequate	  appreciation	  of	  co-­‐benefits.	  Public	  investment	  policies	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  address	  some	  of	  these.	  This	  would	  amount	  to	  reversing	  both	  the	  sell-­‐off	  of	  public	  assets	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  and	  the	  corresponding	  sharp	  decline	  in	  net	  public	  wealth	  to	  near-­‐zero,	  as	  charted	  by	  Piketty	  (2014,	  ch.3).	  	  	  There	  are	  parallels	  between	  the	  calls	  to	  reinstate	  a	  coherent	  public	  investment	  strategy	  to	  deal	  with	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  ‘social	  investment’	  approach	  to	  social	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policy	  pioneered	  in	  Europe	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades.	  Fostering	  a	  ‘new	  green	  industrial	  revolution’	  will	  call	  for	  more	  investment	  in	  R&D,	  universities	  etc.	  at	  the	  upper	  end	  of	  education,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  EU	  Lisbon	  programme	  saw	  a	  link	  between	  this	  and	  earlier	  years	  social	  investment	  (Morel	  et	  al	  2012).	  	  
	   	  
Raise	  the	  share	  of	  public	  consumption	  (G)	  
	  Public	  consumption	  emits	  notably	  fewer	  GHGs	  than	  private	  consumption.	  In	  2008	  it	  accounted	  for	  11%	  of	  UK	  emissions	  compared	  with	  22%	  of	  GDP	  –	  roughly	  half	  the	  emissions	  intensity	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  (Wiedmann	  and	  Barrett	  2011).	  This	  may	  be	  expected	  given	  its	  services	  nature.	  The	  major	  emitters	  are	  the	  NHS	  and	  defence.	  This	  differential	  holds	  when	  comparing	  services	  across	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sectors.	  For	  example,	  the	  health	  care	  system	  directly	  accounts	  for	  8%	  of	  emissions	  in	  the	  US,	  compared	  with	  3%	  of	  emissions	  in	  the	  UK	  (Chung	  and	  Meltzer	  2009).	  This	  is	  due	  both	  to	  the	  greater	  macro-­‐efficiency	  and	  lower	  expenditure	  shares	  of	  the	  National	  Health	  Service	  in	  the	  UK,	  but	  also	  to	  lower	  emissions	  per	  pound	  or	  dollar	  spent,	  presumably	  due	  to	  better	  allocation	  of	  resources	  and	  procurement	  practices.	  Tax-­‐financed	  social	  consumption,	  such	  as	  health	  services,	  social	  care	  and	  education	  is	  also	  inherently	  redistributive:	  allocation	  according	  to	  need,	  risk	  or	  citizenship,	  not	  market	  demand,	  automatically	  serves	  redistributive	  social	  goals.	  Thus	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  social	  consumption	  can	  pursue	  both	  equity	  and	  sustainability	  goals.	  	  
Reduce	  the	  trade	  deficit	  (M-­‐X)	  to	  lower	  the	  outsourcing	  of	  emissions	  	  
	  There	  are	  sound	  macroeconomic	  reasons	  to	  cut	  the	  excessive	  trade	  deficits	  of	  some	  OECD	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  UK.	  But	  when	  the	  outsourcing	  of	  emissions	  is	  recognised	  and	  monitored	  there	  are	  other	  rationales:	  ethical,	  geo-­‐political	  and	  equity-­‐based.	  It	  would	  also	  facilitate	  policy	  alignment.	  For	  example,	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  carbon	  savings	  in	  direct	  emissions	  (S1)	  can	  ‘rebound’	  to	  cause	  rising	  imported	  emissions.	  (When	  respondents	  in	  a	  UK	  survey	  were	  asked	  how	  they	  would	  spend	  any	  savings	  accruing	  from	  lower	  energy	  bills,	  the	  most	  common	  single	  answer	  was	  ‘an	  overseas	  holiday	  involving	  air	  travel’	  (Druckman	  and	  Jackson	  2009:	  2068)).	  This	  imperative	  to	  reduce	  the	  trade	  deficit	  will	  also	  reduce	  the	  share	  of	  real	  consumption	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  
	  
Towards	  sustainable	  and	  more	  equitable	  consumption	  
	  If	  these	  arguments	  are	  correct,	  then	  the	  share	  of	  private	  consumption	  will	  be	  squeezed	  on	  all	  sides,	  by	  several	  percentage	  points	  of	  GDP.	  Given	  present	  inequality	  in	  income	  and	  wealth	  this	  would	  entail	  serious	  distributional	  consequences	  unless	  addressed.	  Thus	  equity	  and	  social	  justice	  considerations	  should	  intrude.	  The	  existing	  social	  and	  economic	  case	  for	  redistributing	  incomes	  is	  augmented	  by	  an	  environmental	  case.	  There	  is	  some	  theory	  and	  evidence	  that	  emissions	  co-­‐vary	  with	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inequality	  (Grunewald	  2015).	  However	  I	  want	  to	  concentrate	  in	  this	  paper	  on	  the	  recomposition	  argument.	  	  This	  entails	  a	  re-­‐analysis	  of	  consumption	  emissions	  along	  two	  new	  axes:	  emissions	  
intensity	  and	  necessity.	  
	  
The	  emissions	  intensity	  of	  consumption	  	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  plot	  the	  emissions	  from	  different	  categories	  of	  consumption,	  using	  both	  national	  and	  global	  input-­‐output	  matrices.	  When	  combined	  with	  national	  consumer	  expenditure	  surveys	  these	  then	  yield	  data	  on	  the	  emission	  intensities	  of	  different	  types	  of	  domestic	  consumption	  (measured	  by	  CO2e/£).	  Studies	  of	  several	  OECD	  countries	  reveal	  that	  housing	  and	  domestic	  energy	  (including	  water,	  electricity,	  gas	  and	  other	  fuels)	  exhibit	  the	  highest	  emission	  intensities,	  followed	  by	  transport,	  food	  and	  restaurants/hotels.	  Lower	  carbon-­‐intensive	  categories	  of	  consumption	  in	  all	  countries	  include:	  education,	  communication,	  clothing	  and	  footwear	  and	  some	  consumables.	  This	  pattern	  holds	  for	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  UK,	  US	  and	  Netherlands	  (Kerkhof	  et	  al	  2009).	  	  	  A	  recomposition	  policy	  would	  seek	  to	  encourage	  private	  consumer	  spending	  on	  low	  carbon	  areas	  and	  discourage	  high	  carbon	  consumption.	  However,	  Norway	  and	  Sweden	  exhibit	  much	  lower	  carbon	  intensities	  for	  housing	  and	  domestic	  energy,	  due	  to	  extensive	  use	  of	  district	  heating	  using	  biomass,	  better	  insulated	  dwellings	  and	  mostly	  renewably	  generated	  electricity	  from	  hydropower.	  This	  reveals	  the	  inter-­‐relationship	  between	  eco-­‐efficiency	  (S1)	  and	  recomposition	  (S2)	  policies.	  	  	  
Recomposition:	  From	  ‘luxuries’	  to	  ‘necessities’	  
	  We	  have	  already	  noted	  that	  to	  pursue	  low	  carbon	  consumption	  in	  a	  context	  of	  extremely	  high	  inequality	  may	  worsen	  distributive	  outcomes.	  If	  further	  recomposition	  is	  needed	  to	  meet	  our	  climate	  targets	  then	  we	  must	  grasp	  the	  nettle	  of	  distinguishing	  necessities	  from	  ‘luxuries’.	  	  	  The	  dominant	  driver	  of	  consumer	  emissions	  in	  all	  developed	  countries	  is	  household	  income:1	  a	  doubling	  of	  household	  income	  usually	  results	  in	  consuming	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  emit	  80-­‐90%	  more	  greenhouse	  gases.	  Rising	  inequality	  comes	  with	  a	  climate	  as	  well	  as	  a	  social	  cost.	  	  	  But	  more	  relevant	  to	  a	  recomposition	  strategy	  is	  to	  distinguish	  necessary	  from	  non-­‐necessary	  consumption.	  There	  are	  essentially	  two	  approaches	  to	  this:	  an	  economic	  one	  and	  a	  social	  one.	  The	  empirical,	  market-­‐based	  way	  of	  distinguishing	  necessities	  
 
                                                                    1	  This	  is	  usually	  calculated	  as	  equivalised	  household	  income	  (that	  adjusts	  for	  household	  size	  and	  composition),	  or	  in	  some	  studies	  total	  household	  expenditure.	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and	  luxuries	  is	  to	  observe	  consumer	  behaviour	  and	  calculate	  the	  income	  elasticity	  of	  demand	  for	  different	  goods	  and	  services.	  If	  demand	  rises	  more	  slowly	  than	  income	  (elasticity	  <1)	  this	  indicates	  a	  necessity;	  if	  demand	  rises	  more	  rapidly	  than	  income	  (elasticity	  >1)	  it	  denotes	  a	  non-­‐necessities	  or	  ‘luxury’	  (Chitnis	  et	  al,	  2014).	  	  Estimates	  for	  the	  UK	  reveal	  that	  electricity	  is	  a	  fundamental	  necessity,	  and	  so	  is	  other	  fuel,	  food,	  alcohol,	  and	  communication.	  Spending	  on	  the	  remaining	  goods	  and	  services	  rises	  faster	  than	  income,	  an	  accepted	  measure	  of	  ‘non-­‐necessities’:	  transport,	  clothing,	  furnishings,	  recreation	  and	  culture,	  restaurants	  and	  hotels,	  education	  and	  health.2	  If	  the	  price	  of	  necessities	  rises	  faster	  than	  that	  of	  luxuries,	  this	  alone	  will	  redistribute	  purchasing	  power	  from	  lower	  to	  higher	  income	  households	  and	  will	  have	  a	  regressive	  impact	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  real	  incomes.	  (Such	  a	  process	  in	  energy	  charges	  has	  been	  charted	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  other	  countries,	  accounting	  for	  the	  inequitable	  impact	  of	  some	  S1	  policies	  that	  raise	  domestic	  fuel	  bills).	  	  
Putting	  these	  together:	  necessity	  x	  emissions	  	  Putting	  the	  last	  two	  forms	  of	  composition	  together	  enables	  us	  to	  plot	  carbon	  intensity	  against	  the	  necessity	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  consumption.	  Table	  2	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	  recent	  findings	  for	  the	  UK	  in	  2009,	  based	  on	  the	  expenditure	  elasticity	  method.	  The	  figures	  in	  brackets	  show	  the	  shares	  of	  total	  GHG	  emissions	  accounted	  for.	  	  	  Table	  2:	  Categories	  of	  personal	  consumption	  by	  necessity	  and	  emission	  content,	  UK	  2009	  	   Low	  emission	  (<1	  tonne	  
CO2e/£000)	   High	  carbon	  (>1	  tonne	  CO2e/£000)	  Necessities	  (income	  el	  
<1)	   Alcoholic	  beverages/tobacco	  (0.7%)	  Communication	  (1.2%)	  
All	  domestic	  energy	  (electricity,	  gas,	  other	  fuels)	  (26.9%)	  Food	  (12.9%)	  	  Non-­‐necessities	  (income	  
el	  >1)	   Clothing	  and	  footwear	  (2.6%)	  Other	  housing	  (2.3%)	  Furnishings	  (5.0%)	  Recreation	  and	  culture	  (8.7%)	  Restaurants	  and	  hotels	  (5.0%)	  Health	  (0.5%)	  Education	  (0.3%)	  Miscellaneous	  (4.2%)	  
All	  transport	  (vehicle	  fuels,	  other	  transport)	  (22.5%)	  
Source:	  Chitnis	  et	  al	  2014:	  Tables	  5,	  A.5	  
 
                                                                    2	  Education	  and	  health	  are	  here	  and	  in	  Table	  2	  included	  as	  “non-­‐necessities”	  since	  the	  issue	  in	  this	  section	  relates	  to	  private	  (market-­‐based)	  consumption;	  of	  course	  social	  consumption	  on	  these	  services	  is	  necessary	  and	  relatively	  equitable. 
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  This	  reveals	  a	  fundamental	  dilemma.	  Most	  non-­‐necessities	  (as	  defined	  and	  measured	  by	  observed	  consumer	  behaviour)	  are	  low	  carbon,	  whereas	  two	  key	  necessities	  –	  domestic	  energy	  and	  food	  –	  are	  carbon-­‐	  and	  GHG-­‐intensive	  and	  account	  for	  40%	  of	  total	  emissions.	  There	  are	  no	  low	  emission	  necessities	  apart	  from	  alcohol	  and	  communication,	  though	  communication	  technology	  is	  destined	  to	  expand	  its	  scope	  in	  the	  future.	  In	  the	  other	  corner,	  ‘transport’,	  which	  includes	  all	  forms	  from	  private	  cars	  to	  air	  travel,	  is	  classified	  here	  as	  a	  high-­‐carbon	  non-­‐necessity,	  accounting	  for	  nearly	  a	  quarter	  of	  total	  emissions.	  	  	  This	  points	  to	  a	  fundamental	  contradiction	  between	  securing	  emission	  reductions	  and	  ensuring	  an	  equitable	  distribution.	  Further	  studies	  of	  marginal	  emission	  intensities	  suggest	  that	  simply	  redistributing	  income	  to	  low-­‐income	  households	  would	  raise,	  rather	  than	  lower,	  emissions	  (Ravaillon	  et	  al	  2000;	  Chitnis	  et	  al	  2014).	  Equity	  and	  sustainability	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  reconcile	  using	  classic	  income	  redistribution.	  It	  requires	  other,	  more	  interventionist	  eco-­‐social	  policies,	  as	  discussed	  below.	  	  	  Clearly	  these	  consumption	  categories	  are	  too	  gross	  and	  encompass	  important	  differences.	  For	  example	  transport	  includes	  both	  basic	  car	  use	  for	  commuting	  and	  shopping,	  and	  vacation	  flights;	  part	  of	  the	  latter	  will	  fairly	  be	  described	  as	  luxuries,	  but	  the	  former	  are	  low-­‐elasticity	  ‘locked-­‐in’	  expenditure	  that	  necessitate	  their	  use	  given	  present	  infrastructure.	  Second,	  the	  low	  carbon	  domestic	  energy	  in	  Sweden	  and	  Norway,	  noted	  above,	  demonstrates	  how	  such	  infrastructure	  can	  profoundly	  reduce	  the	  eco-­‐efficiency	  of	  specific	  sectors	  and	  thus	  the	  equity-­‐sustainability	  trade-­‐off	  pictured	  in	  Figure	  3.	  	  	  Using	  observed	  expenditure	  elasticities	  is	  an	  empirical,	  market-­‐based	  way	  of	  distinguishing	  necessities	  and	  luxuries.	  Alternative,	  more	  collective	  methods	  have	  been	  developed	  within	  social	  policy	  and	  the	  long	  tradition	  of	  poverty	  research.	  This	  has	  spawned	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  budget	  studies	  to	  identify	  a	  basket	  of	  basic	  good	  essential	  for	  effective	  participation	  in	  one’s	  society.	  There	  is	  not	  the	  space	  here	  to	  discuss	  these	  in	  detail,	  but	  we	  can	  note	  the	  ‘decent	  life	  budget’	  approach,	  developed	  by	  Bradshaw	  et	  al	  (2008)	  in	  the	  UK	  that	  is	  now	  being	  adopted	  in	  many	  other	  countries.	  It	  is	  constructed	  using	  two	  sources	  –	  ‘consensual	  discussions’	  among	  ordinary	  people	  informed	  at	  successive	  stages	  by	  expert	  feedback.	  	  This	  exercise	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  minimum	  consumption	  bundle	  that	  in	  some	  respects	  differs	  radically	  from	  the	  norm.	  For	  example	  the	  UK	  citizen	  forums	  have	  decided	  that,	  except	  for	  families	  with	  children,	  private	  cars	  are	  luxuries	  and	  not	  necessary	  for	  a	  decent	  standard	  of	  living	  –	  citizens	  could	  use	  public	  transport	  plus	  taxis	  instead.	  Another	  disjuncture	  from	  actual	  standards	  was	  the	  assumption	  that	  households	  occupy	  dwellings	  closely	  associated	  to	  their	  size.	  In	  the	  other	  direction,	  necessary	  food	  expenditures	  were	  agreed	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  present	  due	  to	  the	  consumption	  of	  more	  fresh	  fruit	  and	  vegetables.	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Druckman	  and	  Jackson	  (2010)	  have	  gone	  on	  to	  calculate	  hypothetical	  UK	  emissions	  assuming	  the	  entire	  population	  were	  living	  on	  this	  ‘decent	  life	  budget’.	  They	  conclude	  that	  emissions	  would	  be	  37%	  lower	  than	  actual	  consumption-­‐based	  UK	  emissions	  in	  2004.	  Almost	  every	  category	  of	  consumption	  would	  deliver	  lower	  emissions	  except	  for	  food.	  Reductions	  were	  particularly	  noticeable	  in	  transport,	  household	  energy,	  restaurants	  and	  hotels,	  and	  miscellaneous	  household	  goods	  and	  services.	  In	  this	  hypothetical	  scenario,	  total	  UK	  consumption	  emissions	  would	  fall	  from	  26tCO2e	  per	  average	  household	  to	  16tonnes.	  This	  is	  a	  significant	  reduction,	  but	  this	  still	  equals	  7.3tonnes	  per	  person	  –	  well	  above	  the	  2050	  goal	  of	  2tonnes	  per	  person.	  	  	  There	  is	  an	  urgent	  need	  for	  more	  research	  on	  the	  necessitousness	  of	  different	  types	  of	  consumption	  which	  would	  permit	  a	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  version	  of	  Table	  3.	  	  
	  
Three	  proposals	  for	  eco-­‐social	  policies	  
	  ‘Recomposition’	  provides	  an	  important	  unifying	  concept	  and	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  potential	  synergies	  between	  economic,	  social	  and	  environmental	  policy	  goals	  (cf	  Sommestad	  in	  Morel	  et	  al	  (eds)	  2012).	  Can	  we	  construct	  ‘eco-­‐social’	  policies,	  defined	  as	  policies	  that	  simultaneously	  and	  explicitly	  pursue	  both	  equity/justice	  and	  sustainability/sufficiency	  goals?	  I	  conclude	  by	  sketching	  three	  ways	  forward:	  taxation,	  pricing	  and	  rationing.	  	  	  
1. Tax	  consumption/	  high-­‐energy	  luxuries	  
	  The	  economist	  Robert	  Frank	  (2011)	  has	  argued	  for	  a	  progressive	  consumption	  tax,	  on	  sustainability	  as	  well	  as	  equity	  grounds.	  A	  major	  justification	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  spending	  habits	  of	  the	  rich	  foster	  an	  unending	  expansion	  in	  mass	  wants	  and	  desires.	  A	  progressive	  consumption	  tax	  would	  certainly	  contribute	  to	  curbing	  this	  spiral.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  progressive	  as	  it	  first	  seems,	  since	  a	  progressive	  consumption	  tax	  equals	  a	  progressive	  income	  tax	  that	  excludes	  savings.	  Since	  the	  share	  of	  savings	  rises	  with	  income,	  this	  alone	  would	  benefit	  higher-­‐income	  groups	  more.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  further	  selective	  taxation	  of	  high-­‐GHG	  luxuries	  is	  more	  important,	  based	  on	  the	  matrix	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  	  	  
2.	  Variable	  energy	  prices:	  public	  allocation	  of	  socio-­‐natural	  resources	  
	  An	  alternative	  approach	  is	  to	  modify	  the	  prices	  charged	  for	  certain	  necessities,	  and	  notably	  public	  utilities.	  Instead	  of	  flat	  rate	  tariffs	  for	  electricity	  or	  gas,	  or	  more	  often,	  tariffs	  that	  decline	  with	  consumption,	  variable	  energy	  pricing	  would	  impose	  lower	  charges	  for	  the	  first	  x	  units	  of	  electricity	  and	  gas	  consumed,	  followed	  by	  progressively	  higher	  charges	  for	  subsequent	  units.	  In	  effect	  such	  policies	  would	  extend	  the	  range	  of	  goods	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  some	  measure	  of	  non-­‐price	  allocation.	  Tony	  Fitzpatrick	  (2014)	  identifies	  a	  set	  of	  ‘socio-­‐natural	  resources’,	  like	  energy	  and	  water,	  over	  which	  citizens	  have	  little	  control	  following	  their	  privatisation	  over	  the	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past	  two	  decades.	  Policies	  are	  needed	  to	  bring	  the	  ownership	  and	  control	  of	  such	  vital	  services	  back	  under	  some	  form	  of	  common	  ownership,	  as	  advocated	  by	  the	  ‘commoning’	  movement.	  This	  would	  also	  permit	  the	  more	  deliberate	  allocation	  and	  pricing	  of	  energy.	  It	  would	  directly	  contradict	  the	  privatisation	  of	  energy	  supply	  and	  distribution	  and	  other	  natural	  monopolies.	  	  	  3.	  Rationing:	  Personal	  carbon	  allowances	  	  
	  A	  separate,	  radical	  proposal	  is	  to	  ration	  carbon	  by	  awarding	  equal	  personal	  carbon	  allowances	  to	  all	  citizens	  (with	  lower	  allowances	  for	  children?)	  within	  a	  national	  emissions	  cap	  that	  would	  normally	  decrease	  year	  by	  year.	  (Environmental	  Audit	  Committee,	  2008	  ;	  Fawcett	  and	  Parag,	  2010	  ).	  In	  effect,	  a	  dual	  accounting	  standard	  and	  currency	  is	  developed	  −	  energy,	  goods	  and	  services	  have	  both	  a	  money	  price	  and	  a	  carbon	  price.	  In	  a	  trading	  scheme,	  those	  who	  emit	  less	  carbon	  than	  the	  average	  could	  sell	  their	  surplus	  and	  gain,	  while	  higher	  emitters	  would	  pay	  a	  market	  price	  for	  their	  excess.	  Advocates	  claim	  that	  a	  scheme	  covering	  domestic	  energy,	  road	  fuel	  and	  air	  travel	  would	  on	  average	  be	  quite	  progressive.	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  it	  could	  generate	  psychological	  and	  normative	  motivations	  to	  encourage	  and	  sustain	  the	  kind	  of	  behavioural	  change	  that	  leads	  to	  emissions	  reduction.	  The	  idea	  has	  been	  criticized	  on	  a	  number	  of	  grounds,	  but	  it	  would	  seem	  well-­‐suited	  as	  an	  additional	  recomposition	  policy.	  	  	  These	  are	  just	  three	  of	  examples	  of	  the	  novel	  policy	  thinking	  required	  to	  marry	  social	  and	  sustainable	  goals.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  dismiss	  the	  range	  of	  redistributive	  S1	  social	  policies	  that	  currently	  constitute	  one	  half	  of	  total	  social	  expenditure.	  The	  continuing	  environmental	  relevance	  of	  inequality	  and	  social	  policies	  for	  redistribution	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  another	  paper.	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